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ABSTRACT
Introduction:
Military trauma registries can identify broad epidemiological trends from neck wounds but cannot reliably demonstrate
temporal casualty from clinical interventions or differentiate penetrating neck injuries (PNI) from those that do not breach
platysma.
Materials and Methods:
All casualties presenting with a neck wound to a Role 3 Medical Treatment Facility in Afghanistan between January 1,
2016 and September 15, 2019 were retrospectively identified using the Emergency Room database. These were matched
to records from the Operating Room database, and computed tomography (CT) scans reviewed to determine damage to
the neck region.
Results:
During this period, 78 casualties presented to the Emergency Room with a neck wound. Forty-one casualties underwent
surgery for a neck wound, all of whom had a CT scan. Of these, 35/41 (85%) were deep to platysma (PNI). Casualties
with PNI underwent neck exploration in 71% of casualties (25/35), with 8/25 (32%) having surgical exploration at Role
2 where CT is not present. Exploration was more likely in Zones 1 and 2 (8/10, 80% and 18/22, 82%, respectively)
compared to Zone 3 (2/8, 25%).
Conclusion:
Hemodynamically unstable patients in Zones 1 and 2 generally underwent surgery before CT, confirming that the low
threshold for exploration in such patients remains. Only 25% (2/8) of Zone 3 PNI were explored, with the high negative
predictive value of CT angiography providing confidence that it was capable of excluding major injury in the majority
of cases. No deaths from PNI that survived to treatment at Role 3 were identified, lending evidence to the current
management protocols being utilized in Afghanistan.
INTRODUCTION
Neck wounds sustained in combat represent between 3 and
18% of all those who survived to assessment at a U.S.Medical
Treatment Facility (MTF) in Afghanistan.1–5 A large propor-
tion of those wounds however are superficial, and a recent
analysis demonstrated that the incidence of actual penetrat-
ing neck injury (PNI), commonly defined as one in which the
platysma layer is breached,6 was approximately 5% between
2004 and 2011.7 The neck is further subdivided into three
zones, as first described by Monson et al.8 A large U.S.
analysis of deaths on the battlefield between 2001 and 2011
demonstrated that 8% of the prehospital deaths caused by
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potentially survivable injuries were attributable to external
hemorrhage from the cervical region, although it did not
subdivide it by zones of the neck.9
Current U.S. military doctrine supports deploying and
organizing health services at levels with progressive capabil-
ities referred to as the four roles of care (Roles 1–4).10 Role
1 providers deliver specialized first aid, triage, and resusci-
tation for neck wounds. Damage control surgery is delivered
at Role 2 by general and orthopedic surgeons. Role 3 hospi-
tals, enable subspecialty surgical with a head and neck trauma
team comprised of a neurosurgeon, otolaryngologist, and oral
maxillofacial surgeon. Since the start of Operation Resolute
Support on January 1, 2015, neck injuries in the Bagram
area of responsibility have been managed by U.S. Air Force
otolaryngology (ENT) and general surgeons,11 with the assis-
tance of U.K. oral and maxillofacial surgeons since February
2019. The rules of engagement enable provision of medical
support to all U.S. and coalition forces, Afghan military, or
civilians working with U.S. and coalition forces, and in some
instances Afghan civilians.12
The management of PNI in a deployed military setting to
a degree remains dependent on the resources available and
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the capabilities of the deployed surgical team.7,13–16 Debate
includes vascular technique (ligation of carotid artery injuries
versus repair in terms of reperfusion risk), choice of incision,
and requirement for a surgical airway (such as conversion of
battlefield cricothyroidotomy to definitive tracheotomy). For
example, in the deployed setting, angiographic intervention
is rarely available and access to PNI in Zone 1 (cricoid to
clavicle) and Zone 3 (lower border of mandible to base of
skull) can be challenging.17,18 Mandatory surgical exploration
of PNI on deployment is advocated by some authorities.19,20
Others have suggested a more conservative approach, with
serial monitoring of a stable patient with no adverse features
on computed tomography (CT) angiography, endoscopy, and
surgical exploration only if the workup is positive or equiv-
ocal.4,14,19 There is currently a drive in the U.S. Military
Health System to develop Combat Casualty Care Knowledge,
Skills, and Abilities that would prioritize surgical readiness
and ensure surgeons from all specialties are equipped with the
knowledge and skills to deploy. In the U.S. military, acute
trauma patient care is guided by the Joint Trauma System
Clinical Practice Guidelines.21
Previous analyses of the management of PNI in Iraq and
Afghanistan have either been based on analysis of the Joint
Trauma Registry7,22–24 or surgical logbooks.19 Trauma reg-
istries utilize Abbreviated Injury Severity codes to identify
broad epidemiological trends but cannot reliably demonstrate
temporal casualty from clinical interventions. For example,
it cannot say if a CT scan was taken before or after surgi-
cal exploration, nor what damage was found intraoperatively
or by investigations such as endoscopy. There is also no spe-
cific Abbreviated Injury Severity code for a neck injury that
breaches platysma (PNI); PNI can only be assumed by the
presence of damage to structures deep to platysma. The aim
of this study was to review the contemporary clinical man-
agement of PNI at a mature U.S. Military Role 3 MTF in
Afghanistan to act as a baseline for future military operations.
METHODS
This study adhered to the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed
patient consent was not required as a result of the nature
of the study. This project was approved as a Performance
Improvement initiative by the U.S. Central Command Com-
mand Surgeon. It was reviewed by the U.S. Army Medical
Research and Development Command’s Office of Research
Protections, Institutional Review Board Office, and given a
Not Research Determination.
All casualties presenting with a neck wound to a Role 3
MTF in Afghanistan between January 1, 2016 and September
15, 2019 were retrospectively identified using the Emergency
Room database. These were matched to records from the
Operating Room (OR) database, and CT scans were reviewed
to determine damage to the neck region. Inclusion criteria
were all PNImanaged at Role 3, whether they had been treated
previously at Role 2 or not. Exclusion criteria were any neck
wound that did not breach platysma. Hospital numbers and
patient names were cross-referenced with surgical operative
records derived from the deployed hospital TC2 database.
Emergency Department records were used to identify discrep-
ancies between temporary patient identifiers and casualties
treated under local anesthesia in the Emergency Department
alone. Casualties were defined as having hemodynamic insta-
bility if they had a systolic blood pressure below 80 mmHg or
required blood products at any point during evacuation or at
Role 2 or 3. Outcome criteria included surgical exploration
and mortality before evacuation from Role 3. Data analy-
sis was undertaken using SPSS Statistics version 16 (IBM,
New York, USA). Odds ratios were determined using a Chi-
Square test with Yates’ continuity correction and reported
with P-values and confidence interval.
RESULTS
During this period, 78 casualties presented to the Emergency
Room with a neck wound. Thirty-seven casualties did not
undergo surgery, of which 9/37 had a CT scan; 0/9 had evi-
dence of PNI. These 37 casualties were excluded from further
analysis. Forty-one casualties underwent surgery for a neck
wound, all of whom had a CT scan (Fig. 1). Of these, 35/41
(85%) were PNI. Treatment of neck wounds required 95 sur-
gical procedures (range 1–4, mean 2) and 59 visits to the
operating theater (range 1–2, mean 1.1). No deaths directly
attributable to treated neck injuries were found. Of these,
25/35 (71%) casualties with PNI underwent neck exploration.
All 35 casualties with PNI sustained their injuries in battle
(Table I). Gunshot wounds (GSW) were responsible for 22/35
(63%) PNI, followed by 13/35 (37%) from explosive devices
(improvised explosive devices, rockets, and grenades). Of
these, 15/22 (68%) GSWs were transcervical, and in 7/22
(32%), there was evidence that the bullet may have frag-
mented.
Of the 35 casualties that sustained PNI (Table II), Zone 2
was the most commonly entry wound location (22/35, 63%).
The most common procedures performed on those 25 casual-
ties with PNI who were explored (apart from wound closure)
were repair of major vessel (6/25, 24%), ligation of major
vessel (5/25, 20%), tracheal repair (5/25, 20%), and a single
repair of an esophagus (4%). Ligation of minor neck vessels
(anterior or external jugular) were noted in three casualties.
Of the six repairs, all were either common or internal carotid
artery. Of these, 1/6 was repaired by primary closure, the
remaining 5/6 with autologous venous patches. When using
patches, 3/5 were recorded as having temporary shunting.
Of the 35casualties with PNI, 25 (71%) underwent neck
exploration (Fig. 1, Table III). The remaining 10/35 had a
washout and primary closure alone. Eight out of 25 casual-
ties (32%) had surgical exploration at Role 2 where CT is
not present and subsequently had a CT when transferred to
Role 3. Of those who underwent exploration at Role 2, 5/8
(63%) were treated as unstable as a result of their PNI. The
remaining 3/8 (37%) had transcervical GSWs, but no records
were found as to why exploration was performed. All eight
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FIGURE 1. Preoperative disposition on decision to perform surgery related to computed tomography. This includes Role 2 where no computed tomography
scanner is present. Some casualties had multiple neck zone entry points hence why they are not cumulative.
TABLE I. Epidemiology of Those Undergoing Surgical
Procedures to the Neck. Explosive Devices Included Improvised








U.S. military 2 1 3
Other coalition military 1 0 1
Afghan National Army 9 16 25
Local civilian 1 5 6
All neck surgical procedures 13 22 35
TABLE II. Penetrating Neck Injury (PNI) Subdivided by Entry
Location and Mechanism of Injury
Entry zone Explosive device Gunshot wound All
1 only 2 5 7
1+ 2 0 1 1
2 only 8 11 19
2+ 3 0 0 0
3 only 2 4 6
1+ 2+ 3 1 1 2
All PNI 13 22 35
having surgery at Role 2 had further surgery at Role 3. Those
12 casualties having neck exploration for PNI before CT were
statistically more likely to be unstable or have hard signs
present (P= .004, OR= 8.09, CI= 2.25–121.23) than those
13 that did not. Two casualties had CT before neck explo-
ration despite being unstable—both were caused by GSWs
TABLE III. CT Result When Performed at Role 3 and Clinical
Management. Those 8/35 Casualties Treated at Role 2 First Are
Excluded. Some Casualties Had Multiple Neck Zone Entry Points
Hence Why the Columns Are Not Cumulative
Effect of CT
on subsequent
management Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 All
No damage on CT
but proceeded to
exploration
















7 17 8 27
entering at the base of Zone 1. Exploration was more likely in
Zones 1 and 2 (8/10, 80% and 18/22, 82% respectively) com-
pared to Zone 3 (2/8, 25%). Zone 1 injuries were all managed
by an incision along sternocleidomastoid, with a midline ster-
notomy extension performed for three casualties. Both Zone
3 injuries treated surgically were described as being a supe-
rior extension of the SCM incision, of which one ligated the
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bleeding vessel and the other was packed and subsequently
bleeding stopped.
Twenty-seven casualties with PNI were managed only at
Role 3 and not previously treated at Role 2 (Table III). Four
casualties who were unstable went straight to Role 3; all had
surgery before CT. Of the 27 casualties, 17 (63%) proceeded
to have surgery. Overall the 27 casualties with PNI, those with
damage on CT were more likely to proceed to surgery than if
no damage was seen but the result was not statistically signif-
icant (P= .119, OR= 243, CI= 0.92–35.5). However, when
analyzing those 12 casualties in which damage was seen on
CT but did not proceed to surgery, there was no statistical dif-
ference whether Zone 1 or Zones 1+ 3were affected (P= .48,
OR= 0.5, CI= 0.08–2.517).
CT had a positive predictive value (PPV) of 44.4% (95%
CI: 26.1–64.4%) and negative predictive value (NPV) of
88.9% (95% CI: 56.8–97.9%) for vascular damage subse-
quently found during surgery (Table S1). The seven casualties
treated at Role 2 first were excluded as the surgery may have
affected interpretation of CTs taken in Role 3.
CT had a positive PPV of 66.7% (95% CI: 18.6–94.6%)
and NPV of 80.0% (95% CI: 65.8–89.3%) for aerodigestive
damage subsequently found during surgery or on endoscopy
(Table S2). Again the seven casualties treated at Role 2 first
were excluded as the surgery may have affected interpretation
of CTs taken in Role 3.
DISCUSSION
This article aims to provide the current state of play regarding
the management of PNI in an austere setting in Afghanistan.
This analysis differs from those in earlier conflicts,13,14 in
that during the period covered in this article (2016–2019),
the majority of those injured were local nationals. The most
common cause of injury was found to be from GSWs (63%)
which is different from articles published from earlier in
the conflict where PNI was predominantly from explosive
devices (57–64%).7,13 Most U.S. and coalition military per-
sonnel would have been wearing ballistic neck collars during
this period studied, which are designed to preventing the per-
foration of explosive fragments into the neck.25 Based on
previous analyses that have shown that neck collars can pre-
vent fragment perforation into Zones 1 and 2 of the neck,25 in
this analysis up to 10 PNI could have been prevented by the
wearing of ballistic neck collars.
In our series, 71% (25/35) of PNI were explored, higher
than that found in civilian practice (19%).26 Exploration was
more likely in Zones 1 and 2 (80% and 82%, respectively)
compared to Zone 3 (25%). The higher incidence reflects a
number of potential reasons. The first is that many of these
explorations took place in Role 2 where a CT scan was not
present and therefore could not exclude damage. A second
reason is that some casualties may have sustained polytrauma
with resultant hemodynamic instability of which it was not
possible to exclude the neck as a cause. Third, there remains
a widely held perception even to this day that there should
be a lower threshold for neck exploration in the prehospi-
tal setting as a result of the unpredictability of the wound
tracts, in particular those from explosive devices, in conjunc-
tion with potentially protracted evacuation timelines. Even in
stable patients, some authors still advocate mandatory surgi-
cal exploration of such wounds.19 Unnecessary explorations
will occur with this approach, with Brennan et al. finding 31%
of neck explorations had no damage.19 However hard signs,
such as an expanding hematoma, or hemodynamic instability
remain the primary indications for surgery before CT.6 In our
series, 11/25 (44%) of those who underwent exploration had
written documentation of hard signs or hemodynamic insta-
bility. Three casualties had surgical exploration at Role 2
without evidence of hard signs; all were transcervical GSWs.
Although there may have been a lack of written documenta-
tion to suggest the indication for surgery, it may reflect that
casualties with transcervical GSWs have a high probability of
injury as a result of the energy transmission, despite contin-
ued debate in the civilian literature.27 Two casualties had CT
before neck exploration despite being unstable—both were
caused by GSWs entering at the base of Zone 1. This reflects
balancing the benefits of localizing a Zone 1 injury to direct
the best intervention with the risks of prolonging surgery in
an unstable casualty. All the other nine unstable patients had
surgery before CT (6/9 were Zone 2).
CT plays an important role in the management of PNI in
the deployed setting, with a deployed radiologist enhancing
rapid diagnosis. The PPV for vascular injury was 44%, lower
than that described in a recent systematic review and meta-
analysis (97%).28 It did however have a high NPV (90%),
similar to civilian series which have reported figures up to
98%.28–30 There are no military studies to compare the find-
ings of our study to and therefore the authors assume that
the value reflects factors intrinsic to ballistic trauma to the
neck in an austere setting. The most common reason is streak
artifact from retained metallic shrapnel or bullet fragments,31
in cases of laryngeal injury, extensive extralaryngeal and
endolaryngeal soft tissue swelling and hematomamay conceal
the site of direct injury.32 CT is best additionally supple-
mented by endoscopy, in particular for suspected aerodiges-
tive injury.6,33 In our series, CT had a positive PPV of 67%
and an NPV of 80% for aerodigestive damage subsequently
found during surgery; this compares favorably with compa-
rable civilian figures for CT esophagoscopy with a PPV of
40–79% and NPV of 82–100%.26,33,34 It is recognized though
that the numbers available to produce these values in our study
are low.
Neck zones have traditionally been used to assist in deter-
mining surgical approach, with Zones 1 and 3 being techni-
cally more challenging to treat, which has, in turn, resulted in
a higher threshold for surgical intervention. However, in our
series, there was no difference in the odds of injuries being
treated in one zone rather than another. The importance of
neck zones in determining interventions is debated in civil-
ian practice, with the “no zone” approach adopted in some










ed/usaa252/5917411 by guest on 13 O
ctober 2020
Penetrating Neck Injuries Treated at a U.S. Role 3 Medical Treatment Facility in Afghanistan During Operation Resolute Support
centers. Such an approach, however, may not be suitable in
the deployed theater, as in particular percutaneous endovas-
cular interventions are generally not available in a deployed
setting.
More vascular repairs occurred in comparison to ligation,
which is different from most previous descriptions.7,14,15,35
It may have, however, reflected that more arterial injuries
were described than venous injuries, the former of which
are more likely to be repaired or grafted if potentially pos-
sible. This positive evolution of PNI treatment is encouraging
and likely reflects the deployment of both trauma and general
surgeons to Role 3 MTFs. Only a single esophageal repair
was described, but this may reflect a low incidence of injury.
Such surgery can be challenging, and traditionally has been
deferred for U.S. and coalition casualties until evacuation to
Germany or the United States. With the greatest proportion
of casualties now being local nationals, definitive esophageal
repair in theater is a skill set needed at Role 3 facilities in
Afghanistan.
We accept there are a number of potential limitations to this
analysis. Operative records were often very brief, particularly
thosewhowere transferred fromRole 2. We have not provided
extracervical injuries or how many blood products were pro-
vided because these could not be accurately determined from
the clinical records. However, senior review of the case notes
would strongly suggest that in the absence of severe associ-
ated injuries necessitating immediate treatment, evacuation to
Role 3 for a CT scan provided improved presurgical planning
and even prevented unnecessary surgery, even in casualties
with instability attributable to PNI. Further analysis utiliz-
ing physiological data, time from injury, and extracervical
injuries should be undertaken to determine clinical outcomes
of those taken directly to Role 2 or to Role 3 with a CT first.
CONCLUSIONS
The majority of hemodynamically unstable patients with PNI
to Zones 1 and 2 underwent surgery before CT, confirm-
ing that the low threshold for exploration in such patients
remains. Only 25% (2/8) of Zone 3 PNI were explored, with
the high NPV of CT angiography providing confidence that
it was capable of excluding major injury in the majority of
cases. No deaths from PNI that survived to treatment at Role
3 were identified, lending evidence to the current management
protocols being utilized in Afghanistan.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplementary material is available at Military Medicine
online.
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